Hitler’s Foreign Policy: Britain’s Dilemma Unveiled

One of the least appreciated aspects of Britain’s foreign policy during the years leading up to World War II is that its policy of appeasement was not initially rooted in fear of Germany, but in fear of communism. The British government viewed a resurgent Germany as a possible bulwark against the Soviet Union, whose spread of communism was seen as a greater threat to Western stability. Instead of confronting German treaty violations, policymakers rationalized that some of Germany’s grievances—especially those stemming from the Treaty of Versailles—were themselves excessive and perhaps worthy of redress. In this climate, Britain and France allowed Adolf Hitler considerable leeway to revise the terms of Versailles and reassert German power on the continent.

The Treaty of Versailles, signed in 1919, imposed severe economic, territorial, and military restrictions on Germany. Many Germans, including Adolf Hitler, saw the treaty as a humiliation and a direct cause of national decline. Hitler's foreign policy revolved around three core aims: abolishing the Treaty of Versailles, uniting all Germans into a Greater Germany, and acquiring Lebensraum, or living space, in Eastern Europe. Lebensraum was aimed particularly at Slavic territories, reflecting Hitler's vision of racial hierarchy and expansion. The notion of uniting all Germans was not limited to the borders of the Weimar Republic—Hitler aspired to bring in German-speaking populations of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and other regions into a single state.

Britain and France’s willingness to allow “revision” of the Treaty of Versailles stemmed partly from domestic pressures. Both nations were grappling with the aftershocks of the Great Depression and significant political divisions at home. Managing economic recovery and social unrest meant that few leaders were eager to risk another major war over treaty enforcement. The early 1920s saw Britain and France accept German policy maneuvers that, in hindsight, laid the groundwork for more radical shifts. One early example came in 1922, when Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Rapallo. This agreement restored diplomatic and economic relations between the two pariah states and allowed for secret military collaboration, something forbidden by Versailles. While it worried some policymakers, the Treaty of Rapallo was not challenged forcefully; it marked the beginning of what historians call “informal appeasement,” where violations of Versailles were tolerated or overlooked.

In 1932, the Allied powers took a significant step by officially scrapping all German reparations. This concession removed one of the most burdensome legacies of Versailles and signaled that the victors of World War I were willing to dilute the treaty’s harshest terms. The following year, Germany sought to secure equal status in military armaments at the Disarmament Conference. When this request for parity was denied, Adolf Hitler promptly ordered Germany’s withdrawal from the conference. That same year, 1933, Hitler escalated Germany’s diplomatic isolation by withdrawing from the League of Nations. He justified this by pointing to the League’s ineffectiveness, citing its requirement for unanimous decisions among its members and its inability to enforce its own mandates. Hitler’s ideological belief in Social Darwinism—where only the strongest nations deserved to survive—provided the rationale for abandoning international cooperation.

One pivotal moment came in 1934, when Germany signed a Non-Aggression Pact with Poland. Many in Britain interpreted this as evidence that Hitler’s intentions were at least partly peaceful and that his regime sought stability, not immediate conflict, in Eastern Europe. This interpretation would later be proven disastrously incorrect, but at the time, it encouraged further tolerance of German initiatives.

The architects of appeasement in Britain and France rationalized their approach not only through fear of communism but also through a belief that the postwar settlement had been too draconian. As early as 1922, with the Treaty of Rapallo, informal appeasement was already shaping European diplomacy. However, appeasement became an official cornerstone of British foreign policy in 1937. The government formalized a doctrine of making concessions to Germany, hoping that meeting at least some of Hitler’s demands would avoid another catastrophic war.

The consequences of these policies were evident in a series of missed opportunities and critical junctures. When Germany signed the Non-Aggression Pact with Poland in 1934, Britain and France viewed it as a genuine sign of peaceful intent. This belief allowed them to ignore the increasingly aggressive and revisionist rhetoric coming from Berlin. Instead of seeing the pact as a maneuver to secure Germany’s eastern flank before launching further expansion, leaders in London and Paris chose to interpret it as a stabilizing measure.

Britain and France’s initial tolerance of German treaty revisions had immediate effects on European stability. By acquiescing to the removal of reparations, ignoring German rearmament, and accepting the withdrawal from the League of Nations, the Western powers sent clear signals that the enforcement of Versailles was no longer a priority. Each concession emboldened Hitler’s regime. The lack of serious opposition to early German moves convinced Hitler and his inner circle that Britain and France were unwilling—perhaps even unable—to stand in the way of German expansion. This atmosphere encouraged more audacious actions, such as the remilitarization of the Rhineland, the Anschluss with Austria, and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.

The long-term shifts set in motion by appeasement and passive acceptance of German actions profoundly altered the balance of power in Europe. British and French willingness to accommodate incremental German violations of Versailles meant that, by the time Hitler turned his attention to Poland, Germany had already rebuilt its military strength, formed crucial alliances, and eliminated many of the territorial constraints imposed after World War I. The road to war was paved not by a single failure, but by a series of cumulative decisions stretching over nearly two decades.

One of the most specific outcomes of these cumulative failures was the Munich Agreement of September 1938. Britain and France permitted Germany to annex the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia, transferring 10,000 square miles of territory and 3.5 million people into German hands. The Czechoslovak state lost its main industrial region and defensible borders, which left it fatally exposed to further aggression. When German troops marched into Prague in March 1939, occupying the remainder of Czechoslovakia, it marked the first occupation of non-German territory by the Nazi regime and shattered the remaining illusions of peaceful revision.

The occupation of Prague forced Britain and France to abandon appeasement. They offered security guarantees to Poland, marking a clear break with the pattern of concessions. Yet, by this stage, Hitler had already signed the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union, removing the threat of a two-front war. On September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland. Two days later, Britain and France declared war.

The cumulative effects of appeasement, rooted in fears of communism and an overly harsh peace settlement, gave Hitler the time and space to systematically overturn the post-World War I order. The failure of collective security, the incremental nature of German expansion, and the repeated misreading of Hitler’s intentions meant that by the time resistance finally came, Germany was in a far stronger position than it had been even a decade earlier. The Munich Agreement alone transferred an industrial region roughly the size of Lebanon and a population nearly as large as modern-day Lithuania to German control.